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Abstract 
 
This work discusses a policy maker-student relation taking into account educational 
standards, asymmetric information and incentives for students to study well. The problems 
discussed are the characteristics of developing countries. 
 
To define educational standards is not enough for an efficient educational system. Supervision 
is desired to minimize moral hazard and not to loose the best students. Especially in 
developing countries where there is no flexible loan market, the state financing of students 
who are studying well could be an appropriate incentive for students to study with more 
enthusiasm and do their best to keep their position in the University. 
 
Key words: Reduction in tuition fee, student’s Excellency, supervision of the Educational 
process, efficient educational system  
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1. Introduction 
 
Education is an important factor that plays an important part in forming a civilized 
community and developing the economy. The strategy of education is of utmost importance 
for each country and modern human being.   
 
The benefits of higher education, both private and public, can be divided into pecuniary, 
relating to or consisting of money, and non-pecuniary benefits. Social returns are the net 
benefits that reach society from both private and public investments in higher education 
(Michael J. Rizzo, (2004)) 
 
An education policy maker, be it private or public, considers several aspects before planning 
and implementing the strategy of the education.  
In modern society young people want to be educated, as they anticipate the high returns from 
schooling after graduating from University. Some of them study well, some of them not so 
well while others even drop out of their studying. The reasons for different levels of 
Excellency are different. In regard to labour market, employers are eager to have a qualified 
labour force because highly productive employees shift the production function. 
 
Overall, the policy maker wants to have a number of good students, students in turn want to 
be educated and employers want to have educated employees.  
 
1.1What questions do this work cover? 
 
1. How to find the balanced higher education system which is desirable almost for all 
members of society? 
 2. How to know if the Educational system is efficient for policy maker and student?  
 In this work I will represent the link between the policy maker and the student and try to 
answer the questions written above. For this purpose I will investigate the aims of a policy 
maker and a student. I will mention the theoretical and empirical discussions around this topic 
concerning the relationships between policy maker and student, student and policy maker. 
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As a real life example, the case of High Educational System of Armenia will be discussed 
trying to compare the pros and cons of the past and present educational policy. Students’ 
incentives will be the key factor during the discussion of this topic. 
There are two important aspects of efficient educational system which are standards and 
incentives for students. 
 
I will try to find out if the efficient educational system is the system where the policy maker 
and students “walk hand in hand”, that is to say when in the presence of the optimal 
educational standard, not too high, and not too low, there are incentives for a student to study 
hard and become a good specialist in the chosen area.  
Educational policy and standards have major role in the studying process of students.  
This work is concerned mainly to the supervision of the educational process. 
 
1.2The structure of the work  
 
The works of several researchers is mentioned shortly in the second section. Principal Agent 
Theory will help to discuss the strategic steps optimal for policy maker and student. Utility 
functions suggested by many authors will be discussed. More detailed discussion of Michael 
Rothschild’s & Lawrence J. White’s (1995) article ‘The Analytics of the Pricing of Higher 
Education and Other Services in Which the Customers Are Inputs’ will be introduced. 
The third section is devoted to the discussion of Armenian higher educational institutions. In 
the forth section the principal agent and game theoretical approaches are presented for the 
High Education system of Armenia. In the fifth section the data analysis is represented. 
 
The data obtained from the Ministry of Education and Sciences of Armenia contain 
Excellency marks of students for two academic years. Via data analysing I will check if the 
chosen part of students which are allowed to study without tuition fee are studying well 
during their university years  and able to compensate the given discounts in their tuition fees 
by studying well.  
Concluding remarks are given in the sixth section. 
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2. Related literatures 
 
The definition of the educational policy can be given as the implementation and the 
supervision of different educational standards. 
When the policy maker is a state it strives to get ‘good’ students for society. When the owner 
of the university is an individual, he or she again strives to get ‘good’ students. Because 
private educational institution in some sense is a market where teachers sell their knowledge 
and the owner gets profit from the tuition fee paid by students. That is why the high reputation 
of its organization is so important for future existence and development of its institute. For 
this purpose in higher educational system policy makers implement some kind of price 
discrimination; they try to compensate a part of the tuition fee of a student in order to attract 
clever students. 
 
There are some controversies in the educational market: on the one hand universities try to 
attract the best students by subsidizing and giving scholarships and grants to their students, on 
the other hand they are non profit organizations and cannot exist for a long time when 
expenses are bigger than profits.  
 
Not going deeper into controversies and making some assumptions, Michael Rothschild & 
Lawrence J. White (1995) wrote an article ‘The Analytics of the Pricing of Higher Education 
and Other Services in Which the Customers Are Inputs’. The model discussed in that work is 
simple but at the same time fundamental, that is why models, referring to Education field are 
frequently linked to that work. They discuss the educational process in ‘production and input-
output’ framework, where human capital is considered to be output and students are 
considered to be inputs. 
 
Educational technology is represented by Gt convex functions 
1.Yt = Gt (s1 t, . . . , sN t ; H1 t, . . . , HN t) , t=1 , . . . , T, 
 
Where Yt is the amount of general resources used in technology t,  
            s tn is the number of students of type n attending university t 
          Htn is the aggregate amount of human capital of type n produced by university t. 
 Human capital is an output and students are inputs as was mentioned above. 
 8 
The optimization problem is given minimum costs to get maximum output. 
 
It follows from the convexity of the G t and from the standard assumptions about the 
production technology that the second order conditions with respect to human capital and 
student are: 
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This condition shows that the optimal allocation of students is such that the marginal 
substitution of a student of type n with respect to general input is the same at all universities 
that students of type n attend. 
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The next condition states that at each University the production of each type of human capital 
should be extended to the point at which its marginal cost is equal to 1. 
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In other words the equation shows that the marginal cost of producing an additional unit of 
human capital should equal its marginal product. 
Rothschild & White (1995) showed that equilibrium prices charged by a competitive industry 
of profit seeking universities satisfy the conditions for an optimal allocation. 
They assumed that each student of type n receives 
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Each university’s problem is to choose Ntt HH ,....,1  so as to minimize Gt (s1 t, . . . , sN t ; H1 t, . 
. . , HN t) subject to NnHH ntnt ,...,1,ˆ =³  
 
Thus, the so called ‘student input market’ is compatible and  Universities have to pay such 
kind of nw wages to students of type n equal or bigger than  their opportunity cost to attract 
the best, productive ‘student input’. The Universities organize production processes and after 
getting the human capital they sell that human capital to the students who were acting as 
inputs at the beginning. After which, the human capital is being sold back to those students. 
 
To conclude, this model allows charging different tuition fees from the different students and 
the students’ net gain of different types will be different and dependent on their marginal 
productivity. Rothschild & White (1995) as limitations of the model mentioned that 
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 1. Although it was assumed that Universities are profit maximisers, in practice universities do 
not cover their expenses through tuitions and it is hard to find out what they are maximizing 
or who is maximizing. 
2. Capital market imperfections in practice put students into inconvenience to pay for 
education. 
3. Although in the model it was assumed that universities were fully informed about students 
types and students were informed about universities types, in real life information 
asymmetries in the education field are faced. 
 
 Winston(1999) has discussed several aspects of Higher education. He wrote that in higher 
education the universities want to know whom they sell human capital and students care about 
from whom they buy human capital. In this case microeconomic scenario, where buyers are 
anonymous and sellers do not want to know who the buyers and also where the presence of 
some type of customers does not influence on the other customers, is not compatible. In 
addition to the model by Rothschild & White, particularly he suggested to take peer quality as 
an input in production function. Peer quality cannot be bought by anyone besides its 
customers-students. Schools control the quality of students by paying subsidies to the best 
students. He concluded that the greater the donative resources, the more schools control the 
student quality. 
 
One interesting result he got by using the data of Winston and Yen, 1995, updated with 1994-
95 data, taking the information about the student subsidy at most of the accredited, degree 
granting colleges and universities in the U.S. The data included 2739 institutions both private 
and public. He calculated and showed that the student at the bottom university from the top 
deciles pays a higher net price (education tuition fee - subsidy) than the student at the top 
university in U. S. 
 
Principal agent theory has its applications in the education sphere as well. Paola and Scoppa 
(2007) examined the relationship between student effort and educational standards in the 
principal agent framework. In this work they analyse the determinants of students’ efforts and 
the optimal educational standards which allow maximizing social welfare functions. 
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The sequential game is arranged by the following order: the policy maker sets the standard 
and in the second stage, students decide how hard to work at school. As the policy maker is a 
Benthamite1 policy maker 
 The social welfare function is the following 
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Productivity of skills is denoted by ep  and 10 £<w is the fraction of that productivity 
( )10 ££ bb  is the weight of effective skills to the attainment of a formal qualification. 
The return to schooling of the individual is represented by the following formula, 
2. bwpbe iesBseW +-³-= )1)(()Pr( , where )Pr( se ³-e  is the probability of obtaining 
the credential, when invested effort by the student is equal to or bigger than the optimal 
educational standard. 
The utility function of the student is presented by 
3. Ui=Wi-c(e,ai) 
After substituting the probabilistic function of returns to schooling into the utility function the 
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Utility maximizing student will find the optimal effort. By differentiating the utility function 
with respect to efforts, the optimal one will be found. 
                                                 
1 Benthamite policy maker sums the utilities of individuals 
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Formula 4 shows that optimal effort °ie is increasing parallel to wage premium, diploma 
bonus )(sB , and ability ia  and is decreasing in g . 
 
Andersson and Konrad (2003) presented the following two period utility function of an 
individual 
1. )()()())(1()( HL xuepxuepeecU +-++-=  
p(e) is the individuals probability of becoming highly productive which is monotonic and 
increasing function 
xL is the individual’s net income of the individual if the latter end up with low productivity 
xH is the individual’s net income of the individual if the latter end up with high productivity 
If there is no private insurance, the FOC of the utility function will be 
[ ])()()(1)( LH mumuepeC -¢=-¢  
Where mH is the individual’s earnings if he or she has high productivity 
           mH is the individual’s earnings if he or she has low productivity 
 
The different tuitions charged from the students can be treated as the Third degree price 
discrimination. In general when different buyers are charged different prices for the same unit 
of good it is called third degree price discrimination. Each buyer pays constant price for each 
unit of the good. Varian (1992) discusses the consequences of the third degree price 
discrimination on welfare functions. He showed that welfare function should be increased in 
order to increase the total output. He stated that if a new market will be opened as the 
consequence of price discrimination than Pareto improving welfare will be exhibited. 
 
Adachi (2003) showed that social welfare can be improved even though the total output is the 
same. It was shown that in the presence of consumption externalities the sum of consumers’ 
surpluses could also increase. When discussing the software market, it was noticed that there 
are positive externalities: the more the students use software the more benefit they get.  
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2.1 Conclusion of the related literature 
 
To conclude by mentioning the articles in this section it was seen that in education sphere the 
policy maker acting as the seller tries to sell human capital to the buyer who is a student in 
this case. Trying to maximize his profit the policy maker makes some discounts for some 
students to sell more goods, that is to say to attract more customers. In recent cases third 
degree price discrimination is revealed. 
 
 In the framework of production function, it can be said that the policy maker pays higher 
price for them to get high qualified inputs and to have an efficient production. The last article 
discussed for the software market provides evidence for the education market as well. In my 
opinion when there are discounts in tuition fee for some students, the consequence is that 
those students have incentives to study and the others have incentives to study hard to be 
included in the first group, when those tuition fee discounts hold. 
 
Although a famous economics statement which is: ‘the sellers and buyer are anonymous’ does 
not hold in education system where the universities and students care about the identity of 
each other, and via profit maximization and with the help of competition, an  efficient field is 
being created for both parts. Now turning to the utility of the student, it was seen that when 
acting the student tries to maximize his utility function by choosing the ‘appropriate’ 
university for getting a ‘good’ education via an efficient price which will maximize his utility 
function. That is why when making educational policy the policy maker takes into account the 
alternative cost of the student. The utility function of a student consists of the returns to 
schooling minus the costs of education. If the labour market rewards the student properly the 
latter will put much effort in getting High education. 
In the next section the Armenian High Education system will be discussed. 
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3. Armenian Higher Education System Before 2005 
 
Armenia is one of the 15 republics of the former Soviet Union. Armenia remains the most 
literate among the republics of the former Soviet Union.  In 1991 Armenia got independence 
and got sovereignty. After the collapse of the central planning the country had a destroyed 
economy, as it is known that the members of the former Soviet Union were connected to each 
other with thousands of economical threads. Each country had been specialized in certain 
field and was a provider of the special raw materials for the central planned industry.          
     
This transitional period affected the Education of the Republic of Armenia. The Armenian 
people gained a high level of education during the period of Soviet Union. People had equal 
right to study and access to study. The attendance to school was compulsory in order to get 
basic education. The various levels of education were free and had centralized financing. The 
quality of education was high as was reported by the international and national surveys. 
 
The educational system of Armenia consists of preschool institutions (kindergartens), schools 
(primary and secondary), vocational colleges, higher education establishments (universities), 
institutes with branches and academies and post-graduate institutes (scientific institutes). 
 
Since 1991, the transitional period of the economy has affected on the educational system. 
Although the programmes and materials of previous years were kept, it was a new period for 
the development of educational system in Armenia. 
High Education Institutes in Armenia have been divided into State and non State Institutes.      
  
In comparison to the other educational systems of the world, the Armenia private high 
educational system not always means a good quality of learning. The majority of people try to 
enter the state higher educational establishments, moreover, in labour market diplomas or 
credentials of private higher educational institutions are not so widely accepted as state 
institutes credentials. The graduates   of the non state Universities are given an opportunity to 
participate in final exams for graduating and getting diploma of state sample2. 
 
                                                 
2 Acknowledged by state  
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For entering higher educational establishment the applicants had to study hard and even to 
take extra lessons with the help of tutors.  There are two aspects of this issue; on the one hand 
it can be seen as the weakness of schools, because they can not prepare their pupils to take 
entering exams easily. On the other hand it can be a proof of the high educational standard for 
entering high educational establishments.  
 
Universities have 3 three level system. First level is a bachelor degree, which lasts 4 years, 
after it students can continue their study for 2 years and get a master degree.  
During these 2 years the students get broader knowledge in the chosen area.  
The Specialist Diploma is awarded to those having completed secondary education and 
followed five years of higher education. 
The third level is PhD level, which requires 2 or 3 years studying. 
 
To enter the University applicants participate in centralized exams since 1991.The whole 
applicants of all Universities take the same exams of math, foreign language, native language 
and other subjects. The number of exams they should take depends on chosen profession and 
the requirements for that particular speciality.  
 
After taking exams, applicants take part in competition. Some of them are allowed to study 
free paying ‘no tuition fee’ and the others are allowed to study with tuition fee. Naturally the 
rest of students are being missed because of low grades. After entering University students 
study as was decided beforehand, as a result of competition among them one part of them 
study in a ‘no tuition fee’ system, and others study in a ‘tuition fee’ system. The part which 
study in a ‘no tuition fee’ system each month gets scholarship from state equal to 100 SEK 
and the students who study excellently get 120 SEK. As for the students studying in a ‘tuition 
fee’ system, with only excellent marks they paid only half of the tuition fee. 
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3.1 Armenian Higher Educational System After 2005 
 As mentioned above there are private and state higher educational institutions in Armenia. 20 
state (where 4 are established by intergovernmental agreements) with their 14 branches3 
(usually located in other cities than capital). There are 33 private universities accredited by the 
state and the next 39 without accreditation (total 72). State Universities have 61.000 and 
private Universities have 15.000 students accordingly (National tempus, 2007). In 2006, 
public institutions were educating 52,100 students, whereas 21600 students were being 
educated in private institutions. (Statistical Yearbook of Armenia, 2006) Non-state 
universities or private universities are mainly based on tuition fees. In State universities there 
are state ordered and fee-paying students. About 60-70% of students in State Universities are 
tuition fee paying. Each year the government of RA defines and proves the number of the 
needed specialities.     
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
According to Constitution of Republic of Armenia, adopted in 1995, all citizens of Republic 
of Armenia have the right to get education; the secondary education in public schools is free; 
and every citizen has the right to get higher or other professional education on a competitive 
basis.                                                                                             
Since 2006 there have been some changes. After the end of the first academic year the grades 
of students are taken into account to publish the names of students who will study in a ‘no 
tuition fee’ system. It means the students easily give their place to their class mates if they do 
not study well. The next reform in High Educational System (HES) of Armenia is the 
integration of European standards. Old grading system changed into ECTC system. The 
acceptance of the credit system in High Education of Armenia was in 2006-2007 academic 
year. Students should gather credits in order to be transferred to the other level of studying 
and of course for getting the final diploma. 
The main activities included in the Law on Higher and Postgraduate Professional Education 
and approved in December 2004 are the followings (national tempus 2007) 
1. Developing quality assurance mechanism; 
2. Establishing a platform for recognition of Armenian HE degrees and cycles by    European 
area for HE, facilitate the mutual recognition of qualifications; 
                                                 
3 Here by saying Branch it should be understand the same university with the same departments in the other 
region than Yerevan, capital of Armenia 
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3. Developing standards in Higher Education aligning to international ones; 
4. Promoting a system of credits (such as ECTS); 
5. Setting up a national ECTS office to develop guidelines on credit transfer system; 
6. Setting up a national office for foreign degrees recognition; 
7. Promoting Armenian involvement into ENIC and NARIC network and implementing 
Lisbon convention statements; 
8. Harmonizing Armenian Diploma Supplement to European standards; 
9. Developing students’ scholarship system; 
10. Establishing links between HE sector and labour market; 
11. Improving efficiency of HE sector; 
12. Setting up career centres at universities, etc. 
Armenia joined the Bologna Process in May 2005. RA recognized the importance of the 
establishment of the European Higher Education area by 2010 where staff and students can 
move easily and can have fair recognition of their qualifications. Co-operation between 
national educational system and between higher educational institutions in Europe will 
facilitate the process of reformation and tighten Armenian higher educational system.    
(Sargsyan, Budaghyan 2007) 
 
To sum up, the state recently has tried to be integrated in the worldwide market of education 
to accept and implement educational standards. The educational system is still very important 
issue for high authorities and they are eager to have strong educational system. 
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3.2 Difficulties in the Educational system of Armenia 
 
In high educational system there are some obstacles, difficulties. These difficulties are 
characteristics of every developing country. For instance there is a corruption in educational 
system of Armenia. The next problem is weak system of financing the students and absence 
of a flexible loan market. Mainly students get finance from their parents’ earnings. 
Unfortunately the unemployment rate of the population is high. 
 
Although the ratio of unemployed people in total unemployment who have high education is 
not so high, after getting educated it is difficult to find a job in labour market. There is no 
flexible connection, links between labour market and Universities, as was for instance during 
the Soviet Union period, when the next day after graduating student had work according to his 
speciality. 
 
The other problem is the slow modernization of the textbooks, materials and programmes and 
sometimes not trained lecturers who are not ready for serving these new programmes. 
 
Another problem is the low salaries of staff, small amount of scholarships for students, 
compared with Soviet Union period, when for instance the monthly scholarship was enough 
to strive. 
 
To conclude there are a lot of challenges remained from the central planning economy and 
renewed problems, which are peculiar to the transitional economy. 
In my point of view these later changes in High Education System have some advantages, 
now policy maker and student relationships will be discussed in the framework of principal 
agent theory. 
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4. Principal-Agent approach 
 
In the Education sphere, the principal is a policy maker, the agent is an academic (Ghosh and 
Rodgers (1999)) or a student.  
 
Taking into account the main ideas of the principal agent theory (Varian (1992), it can be said 
that in this case principal wants to induce maximal efforts from student in order to get much 
profit in the future.  The principal in the Higher education system of Armenia will be act as a 
monopolist, because it offers a qualified education compared with private High Educational 
Institution (HEI). Policy maker wants to maximize B-X, where B is a future benefit from the 
educated students, and X is the tuition fee paid by principal.  
 
It is assumed that the Policy maker (the state) will benefit from the future earnings got of the 
student. The student will pay taxes and society and state will benefit not only from the 
taxation but also from the professional investments and skills of the student. This thus gives 
rise to a type of Social welfare function. 
 
max B-Xb 
Such that Xb-Cb>=ū participation constraint of the student  
Xb-Cb>Xa-Ca incentive constraint of the student, 
 
 Where C4a and    Cb are participation costs for the agent, when doing a and b actions 
accordingly. The agent will find an action b strictly preferable to a action, as in this particular 
case, studying in the State University is much more preferable than studying in the private 
University. As was mentioned above the State universities in Armenia are higher ranked 
compared to the Private Universities. Even though the tuition fees of the private Universities 
are less than the tuition fees of the state Universities the returns of schooling from graduating 
state university is usually accepted to be higher. 
Naturally the principle wants X be as small as possible, that is why participation constraint 
will bind that X=ū+ Cb. Hence the objective function of the principal is: 
 
                                               Þ                  max B- ū- Cb 
                                                 
4 Here it is assumed, that participation costs are tuition fees from state and private universities. 
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In the student’s point of view Cb is equal to 0, when the policy maker agrees to pay the tuition 
fee instead of the agent (student). If the incentive constraint had included the returns to 
schooling, we could refer to Ca, as an alternative cost to work in the labour market instead of 
studying. The agent is paid X tuition fee to implement his b action and to provide the 
principal with output B, otherwise the principal will punish the agent and find another student, 
more capable to bring B profit. 
Xa is a profit from studying in a private alternative University.  
 
Thus, in the third section we have discussed two systems, in the first one, where after entering 
University till graduation the status of students were not change, has its shortcomings: Moral 
Hazard was big for policy maker. Only the entering exams are not enough to conclude, to be 
sure that chosen students will do their best to become good specialists in the particular sphere.  
 
Students, entering University and studying in a ‘no tuition fee’ system were confident that 
their place will remain no matter how they will study. Naturally, clever students were chosen 
as a result of competence, but there were some weak places in that policy. For instance, a 
student could be lucky and the day of examination got very familiar topic or problem to solve, 
which he solved before for a few times. Other example could be, when a student has high 
abilities to study well, but because of excitement, he could not show himself, his abilities 
maximally5.    
 
 Thus the state could frequently experience adverse selection: that is to say not financing best 
or more capable students’ studying.  
Now the new rule lowers moral hazard, as the policy maker follows the students, agents, how 
they study during their academic years. Policy maker in its turn wants to be fair and finance 
best students who are eager to study well and be future sophisticated employees for future 
national economy. 
 
It may be the case that because Armenia is a developing country, financing is an important 
aspect for students. There is a real competition among them; everyone wants to get rid of the 
tuition fee. 
                                                 
5 No retake exams are allowed during the entering exams 
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The game theoretical approach will now be presented, which describes State-Students 
strategies and gains from these strategies. 
 
4.1 Game theoretical approach 
 
4.1.1 Setup of the game 
 
Below the policy maker-student relations will be discussed in the case of Armenian Higher 
education system in a game theoretical framework. Two policy types will be discussed 
separately and compared with each other. 
There are 2 cases:  
 
Case1: the policy maker uses the old approach. Students after having taken the centralized 
exams on the basis of competition study in the ‘tuition fee’ system or the ‘no tuition fee’ 
system. The Policy maker does not care how well the students study. No matter how many 
excellent or satisfactory grades the student has, if he or she has been accepted in the ‘no 
tuition fee’ system during his/her academic year no tuition fee will be required.  The students 
studying in the ‘tuition fee’ system will pay half of the tuition if they study excellently; 
otherwise they pay the full tuition fee. 
  
Case2: the policy maker uses the new approach. Students after having taken the centralized 
exams on the basis of competition are chosen to study either in the ‘tuition fee’ system or in 
the ‘no tuition fee’ system. The Policy maker cares about the Excellency of the students. After 
the academic year students who have excellent marks on the basis of competition will be 
allowed to study in the ‘no tuition fee’ system. 
 
Thus, the main difference between these two cases is that in the second case the students 
further paying tuition fee depends on his/ her Excellency marks no matter in what system the 
student has been accepted either in the ‘no tuition fee’ system or ‘tuition fee’ system. In other 
words the students with higher grades will get rid of the tuition fee while the other students 
comparatively with lower grades must pay the tuition fee. 
The  Players of this game is the policy maker and the student.  
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Payoffs are described by the variables X, Z, B where  
X is a tuition fee. When a student studies well the policy maker pays that tuition fee instead of 
the student so it becomes a cost for him. X is a random variable from 150.000 Armenian 
Dram to 450.000 Armenian dram or in Swedish kronas it will be, according to the exchange 
rate of the Armenian Central bank, by 2009-02-02 1SEK=36.34, so 150.000 AMD=4128 SEK 
and 450.000 AMD=12383 SEK annually. 
Z is a yearly scholarship paid to student, when he studies with excellent marks. Z =12* 
6000AMD which is equivalent to 1981 SEK. 
B is a future benefit for society from the particular student studying well. In other words it is 
the returns of investment for society, not individual salary of the student but the taxes paid by 
future specialist and other profits which society gets because of the involvement of the student 
in society. 
Throughout the game XB ³  being the upper limit of the B is difficult to define because for 
a precise definition, a special analysis should be made in order to find the maximal benefit 
brought by the student who studied with excellent marks. A Precise figure is difficult to say 
for the case when that student in the future becomes a scientist and does some innovation and 
the innovation is used in practice. The profits from that for society are hard to account. 
However econometric analysis would help to find out the approximate upper limit of the B. 
For simplicity I will assume that B=2X. 
  
In this game the first movement/step will do the Policy maker by defining the educational 
policy which is ‘Control’ or ‘not Control’6 after that the student having accepted either in 
‘tuition fee’ or in ‘no tuition fee’ system decides whether to study well or badly. Payoffs of 
the players are presented in accordance with these two cases that is to say the game is divided 
into two parts or in two sub games. Below the strategies and related payoffs are presented. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Control is equivalent to the new approach, where there is supervision and Not Control is equivalent to the old 
approach, which assumed no supervision of the students’ grades during their university years 
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4.1.2 Strategies and concerning payoffs 
 
 1.    In the ‘Case1’ that was defined above to be ‘Not Control’ strategy of the policy maker 
the payoffs of the participants are the following: 
1.1.1 
If a student accepted in ‘no tuition fee’ studies well he gets Z, the policy maker gets   –X-
Z+B, as policy maker pays for the tuition fee and the monthly scholarship for the student.  
1.1.2 
If the student accepted in ‘no tuition fee’ studies badly he gets 0 and accordingly the policy 
maker gets –X, because if the student has been accepted in ‘no tuition fee’ system, the policy 
maker have to pay the tuition fee instead of the student, no matter how he or she studies. 
1.2.1  
If the student accepted in ‘tuition fee’ system studies well he gets -0,5X and the policy maker 
gets -0,5X+B. In other words half of the tuition fee pays the student and the next half of the 
tuition fee pays the policy maker. 
1.2.2 
 If the student accepted in ‘tuition fee’ studies badly he gets –X and the policy maker gets 0. 
 
2.  In the ‘Case 2’ the payoffs of the participant are the following 
2.1.1 
If a student accepted in ‘no tuition fee’ studies well he gets Z, the policy maker gets 
 –X-Z+B. 
2.1.2 
If the student accepted in ‘no tuition fee’ studies badly he gets –X, which means that the 
student pays the tuition fee and the policy maker gets 0. 
2.2.1  
If student accepted in ‘tuition fee’ system studies well he gets Z, that means he or she not only 
gets rid of the tuition fee but also receives  a scholarship ,and the policy maker gets –X-Z+B. 
2.2.2 
 If the student accepted in ‘tuition fee’ studies badly he gets –X and the policy maker gets 0. 
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4.1.3 Normal and extensive forms of the game 
 
Considering all the information we have it is apparent that the game discussed is a game of 
perfect information. The Student’s strategies which are studying well or badly are freely 
supervised by the policy maker at the end of each academic year.  
The Sequence of the game is as follows: it starts from the entrance of the policy maker who 
decides which type of policy to implement either ‘Control’ or ‘Not Control’. Then Fee or no 
Fee types are assigned to the student. The Student has 2 strategies in each case: ‘study well’ or 
‘not study well’. 
In the game tree the payoffs of the policy maker are represented for two cases  
Game tree for the each case will look like: 
Picture 4. 1 Extensive form of Case 1 
 
Picture 4.2 Extensive form of Case2 
 
   No Fee     Fee 
Study 
 well 
Study     Study 
Badly    well 
   
Study 
badly 
Case 2 Control 
(-X-Z+B, Z)                    (0, X)               (-X-Z+B, Z)                      (0, -X) 
   No Fee     Fee 
Study 
 well 
Study     Study 
badly       well          
   
Study 
badly 
Case 1  Not Control 
                     (-X-Z+B, Z)                       (-X, 0)                 (-0,5X+B, -0,5X)                  (0, -X) 
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The extensive forms of these 2 sub games are presented below: 
 
 The normal form of the Case1 will be presented in Table 4.3.a, which is based on the 
information of Picture 4.1. 
 
Table4.3.a Normal form of the Case 1 
  SS                 NN            SN             NS 
 
After the plugging the value of B=2X 
 
Table4.3.b Normal form of the Case 1 
  SS                NN            SN             NS 
 
 
 
The normal form of the Case2 is given in Table 4.4.a, based on the information of the Picture 
4.2. 
 
Table4.4.a Normal form of Case2 
 
     SS             NN            SN             NS 
 
 
After the plugging the value of B=2X 
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Table4.4.b Normal form of Case2 
  SS             NN            SN             NS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1.4 Solutions of the game 
 
 After having constructed the extensive forms of these 2 sub games, it is worthy to discuss 
Nash equilibrium solutions of each case. Looking at the Table 4.3.b it could be found that 
there are 3 Nash Equilbria, which are No Fee SN, Fee SS and Fee NS. 
Now looking at the Table 4.4.b it can be seen that for the Case2 the Nash Equilibriums 
Solutions are No fee SS, No Fee SN, Fee SS and Fee NS. 
 
 From these solutions Sub Game Perfect Nash equilibriums should be considered as the final 
solution of the games. For this purpose I use ‘Backward induction’ method. I start to analyze 
the game tree from the end and eliminate ‘bad strategies’. Policy maker chooses either 
‘Control’ or ‘Not Control’, then the students in each educational policy, accepted either in ‘no 
tuition’ fee system or ‘tuition fee’ system has two strategies either ‘to study well’ or ‘not to 
study well’.   
Backward induction starts from the discussion of the payoffs of the student. Hence, after 
filtering ‘good choices’ from bad choices for both players, the ‘Sub game Perfect 
Equilibrium’ for the Case1 is ‘Not Control’ SS and for the Case 2 it will be   Not Control SS. 
 
Thus, having compared the payoffs of the game participants in each case, it is obvious that in 
each case student should study well. 
 
To conclude the solutions of the entire game are two SPE: 
The payoffs for the Case1 is (X-Z,Z) when the policy maker chooses ‘Not Control’ and 
student plays ‘to study well’ accepted in the ‘no tuition fee’ system and (1,5X, -0,5X) when 
        Z 
X-Z 
     -X 
0 
       Z 
X-Z 
       -X 
0 
        Z 
X-Z 
     -X 
0 
    -X 
0 
       Z 
X-Z 
     No     Fee 
      Fee 
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the policy maker plays ‘Not Control’ and the student accepted in a ‘tuition fee’ system plays 
‘to study well’. 
 
The payoffs for the Case2 are  (X-Z, Z) when the policy maker plays ‘Control’ and student 
accepted in a ‘ no tuition fee’ system plays  ‘to study well’ and it is (X-Z, Z) when the policy 
maker plays ‘Control’ and the student accepted in ‘tuition fee’ system plays ‘to study well’. 
As it can be noticed from the solutions discussed above there is no Pareto preferred one.   It is 
seen from the solution that the payoffs for the student in Case 2 are more secure as he gets Z 
when playing optimally in each situations irrespective of the preferable system, i. e. ‘tuition 
fee’ system or ‘no tuition fee’ system. 
 In the regard of the payoffs of the policy maker he gains much in Case 1, which is ‘Not 
Control’ when student is studying in a ‘tuition fee’ system and he studies well.         On the 
other hand in real life if B is large enough the policy maker will not care much about tuition 
fee X. 
 
In the point of view of the student who studies well it is more preferable for him that the 
policy maker plays ‘Control’, because in this case the student gets Z and he has more 
incentive to study by means of money praised, to compete to other students and to be selected 
based according to higher intellectual abilities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 28 
 
5. Data and Methodology 
The data about Excellency was provided by the Ministry of Education and Science of the RA, 
for two academic years 2005/2006 and 2006/2007. The data is arranged according to the 
Universities. The provided information in the form of tables are presented in the Appendix 
named Table A1, A2, A3 and A4. Information is mainly divided into two parts: students 
studying in a ‘tuition fee’ system and students studying in a ‘no tuition fee’ system. Table A1 
and table A2 provide data about the student’s excellency7, studying in the State High 
Educational Establishments of Republic of Armenia for the 2005-2006 academic year, second 
exam session. The next A3 and A4 tables provide information about 2006-2007 academic 
year separately for the students studying in ‘no tuition fee’ and ‘tuition fee’ systems.                                                                                                                                
Recalling section 3, it is worthy to mention that during University studying the measurement 
grade is between 2-5 scale8, where: 
 2 is equivalent to fail,  
3 is equivalent to satisfactory,  
4 is equivalent to good,  
5 is equivalent to excellent.  
Though I tried to transfer these grades into ECTS grading scale before starting to analyse I 
found some difficulties in the respect of preciseness of 2-5 grading scale, it does not allow to 
have 2,5 or 4,5 it only gives integers like 2,3,4,5. 
I will use descriptive data analysing in order to                                                            
1. See the differences in grades of students studying in the ‘no tuition fee’ system           
and the ‘tuition fee’ system.                                                                                                        
2. See whether the new approach conducted by the policy maker is more                
efficient.                   
Hence, for academic years 2006-2007 it is expected that the number of students who studied 
well9 will be more than in the previous period. It is connected with the new policy conducted 
                                                 
7 The word Excellency is used under the meaning of students’ grades, what grades they have, excluding failed 
exams. 
8 In the tables of appendix numerical information is replaced by the mentioned equivalents. 
9 Under the expression ‘study well’ it will be assumed that it means to study either with only excellent marks or 
with excellent and good marks. The recent requisite is also taken into account because of the case when in the 
class there are no students with only excellent marks, as a consequence of the competition the students with good 
and excellent marks will have tuition fee reductions 
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by the policy maker. In other words the students will be more eager to study well, as they 
expect reductions in their tuition fees. Recalling the Game Theoretical part of the game it is 
taken for granted that the rational thinker will do his or her best to study well in order to get 
more profit. On the other hand not all students have the same high abilities and several other 
factors such as life conditions, educated parents and philological characteristics.    Although it   
is expected that in 2006-2007 academic years students would probably study well, this 
numbers could not serve as ideal measurements because of the cohort effect which is: when a 
student accepted in an old educational system (before or in 2005), who will study more than 
one year will continue in the same studying conditions as he or she was accepted before.                    
5.1 Data analysis for the period 2005-2006  
 
In This section I will look through the data for the academic year 2005-2006.  
Ministry of Education of Armenia provided   the following information: 
The information about newly created State University of Goris is not included in the Higher 
Educational Establishments of Republic of Armenia. At the beginning of the academic 
session there were 53 799 students. 17 662 students of which were studying without tuition 
fee and 36 137 students were studying with tuition fee. Academic vocation was given to 941 
students. 52 792 students ought to take exams. Only 52 098 students were allowed to take 
exams. 
How did the students study during 2005-2006 academic years? 
Table 5.1.1 provides information about the students’ grades. 
 
Table 5.1.1 Information about the students’ grades proportional to their number in each system. 
2005-2006 academic year. The percentage of students with different marks 
                                                                                     No Tuition Fee         Tuition Fee    Total 
Students, who have passed the exams10 78.4% 64.7% 69% 
Students with only excellent marks 21.5% 11.8% 15.1% 
Students with ‘excellent’ and ‘good’ marks 22% 16.5% 18.5% 
Students with ‘satisfactory’ marks 9.2% 11.4% 10.7% 
Students with ‘unsatisfactory’ marks 18% 28.4% 25% 
NOTE Students, who have passed the exams are the students without unsatisfactory marks or in other words without any fail exam. Under the row named 
‘students with unsatisfactory marks’ it should be understood the proportion of students who have either one, two or three unsatisfactory marks. The percentage of 
the students with mixed marks is not included in the table, since it will not give any valuable information. 
                                                 
10 It is equivalent to say the students without any unsatisfactory grade or failed exam 
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 Looking at the table 5.1.1 it can be easily understood   that the students in the ‘no tuition fee’ 
system studied better compared to the other system. It is worth mentioning that percentage of 
the students in the ‘no tuition fee’ system  with excellent marks is twice higher than in the 
other system The percentage of the students with excellent and good marks studying in ‘no 
tuition fee’ system is 5.5 % higher than the one in the other system. 
 
Figure 5.1.2 represents the percentage of the students studied excellently. It is seen that nearly 
all Universities provided more percentage of the students with only excellent marks studying 
in the ‘no tuition’ fee system than in ‘tuition fee’ system. There are some exceptions such as 
Gavar SU and YSU Architecture and Construction, YSU Linguistic University and  AS 
Pedagogical University, where students in the ‘Tuition fee’ system provided higerer 
percentage. On the other hand Gavar SU did not have any students studying in the ‘no tuition 
fee’ system 
 
Figure 5.1.2 The percentage of students with only excellent marks 2005-2006 academic year 
The percentage of students with only excellent marks 
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NOTE The figure is based on the following calculation: The number of students with only excellent marks/ the number of students who 
were allowed to take exams. The calculations are done with respect to  each University. 
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Further from Figure 5.1.3 it could be seen that students in the ‘tuition fee’ system had more 
failed exams, than their peers in the ‘no tuition fee’ system. 
 
Figure 5.1.3 The percentage of the students with fail marks 
The percentage of the students with fail marks
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NOTE The figure is based on the following calculation: The number of students with unsatisfactory marks (they could have either one, 
two or three failed exams)/ the number of students who were allowed to take exams. The calculations are done with respect to  each 
University. 
 
Although it was very evident that the students in ‘no tuition fee’ system studied better, it is a 
little bit odd to compare the excellency of the Art University with the Economic or Medical 
University.  
 
In the next subsection 2006-2007 academic years are discussed which will provide basis to 
compare two periods. 
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5.2 Data analysis for the period 2006-2007 
 
The purpose of discussing the academic period 2006-2007 is to find out the changes between 
two educational policies.  
Were there any changes in the percentage of the students with respect to their grades after the 
implementing new educational policy? 
 
There were 51 238 students during the second academic quarter in the year 2006-2007 in the 
High Educational Establishments of RA, (where the number of the graduates from the State 
University of Armenia is not included11). From the number 51 238, 848 are for the students 
for whom there were formed academic vocation. 49 879 students had to take an exam, and 
only 49 508 were allowed to participate in the exams. 35 600 students passed their exams, 
scheduled by the academic plans, which makes the 71.4 % of the whole exam takers.  
 
The excellence12 of the students is high in the University of Art, precisely it is 88.1% for the 
Yerevan State Institute of Theatre and Cinema, 76.2% for Yerevan State Academy of Fine 
Arts, 71.8% for Yerevan State Conservatory and especially in its branches. Although in these 
High Educational Establishments also the excellence of the students in the system ‘tuition fee’ 
is lower than the students from the system ‘no tuition fee’. Thus, Yerevan State Institute of 
Theatre and Cinema is described by the 85.1%-93.4% Excellency. Yerevan State Academy of 
Fine Arts is described with 70.5%-85.6%, Yerevan State Conservatory with 60.2%-90.4% 
Excellency. 
 
In some Universities the excellence of the study does not reach even to 50%. For example, in 
‘Ijevan’ branch of the Yerevan State University the excellence of studying is 40%/’no tuition 
fee’ system 70.9 %, with tuition fee system, 25.9%/. The excellence of studying in ‘Ijevan’ 
branch of the Yerevan State University is lower by  30.8% than the avarage excellence of the 
Republic, the excellence of the students, studing in the system ‘tuition fee’ is 41.1% lower 
than the avarege rate of the Republic. 
 
                                                 
11 Note: State University of Armenia is the largest university with the largest number of students 
12 Here by saying Excellency is meant that the number/percent of the students who passed their exam and did not 
fail. 
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To conclude the grades of the students are dependent on the field they study. The above 
discussion shows that usually art students study better than the students in other occupations. 
 
The total percent of students, who passed their exams, is 84.9% and 67% for the students 
studying free and with tuition fee respectively. These recent numbers represent the percent of 
the students who attended to exams and did not fail, so they could get any grades besides fail.  
These results show that overall, the students in the ‘no tuition fee’ system studied well 
compared with the other system. 
Table 5.2.1 Information about the students’ grades proportional to the students number in  each system. 
2006-2007 academic year. The percentage of students with different marks 
                                                                                   No Tuition Fee       Tuition Fee          Total 
Students who have passed the exams 84.9% 67% 72% 
Students with only ‘excellent’ marks 25% 9.52% 14% 
Students with ‘excellent’ and ‘good’ marks 27% 16% 19% 
Students with satisfactory marks 5.5% 9.6% 8.4% 
Students with unsatisfactory marks 13.2%, 28.2% 24% 
NOTE Students, who have passed the exams are the students without unsatisfactory marks or in other words without any fail exam. Under 
the row named ‘students with unsatisfactory marks’ should be understand the proportion of students who have either one, two or three 
unsatisfactory marks. 
 From Table 5.2.1 it may be seen that that the percentage of students studying excellently13  is 
bigger for the  ‘no tution fee’ system compared with ‘tution fee’ students. In other words we 
can judge that students try to keep their place, and workaholic and clever students mostly 
study in the ‘no tuition fee’ system. Recalling subsection 5.1 and the table 5.1.1 it could be 
said that there is a big jump in particular cases, for instance the percantage of the students 
with only excelent marks is 2.6 times bigger in the ‘tuition fee’ system compared with the 
other system. As for the percantage of the students with excellent and good marks the 
percantage for ‘no tuition fee’ is 1,68 times higher than the percentage in the’tution fee’ 
system. I have grouped each High educational isntitution taking into account its branches’ 
result.  
From Figure 5.2.2 it is seen that only in YS Academy of Fine Arts the students studying in the 
‘tution fee’ have more friends among them studying with excelent marks than students 
studying in the ‘no tuition fee’ system. In  Gavar State University the number of excelent-
studying students in a ‘no tuition fee’ system was 0.  
                                                 
13 Here under the word excellent it is meant that student got excellent mark, in our case ‘A’ is  equivalent to ‘5’ 
for the Armenian Educational system 
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Figure 5.2.2 The percentege of students with only excellent marks 
The percentege of students with only Excelent marks
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NOTE: The calculation of percentages was based on the numbers of students, who were allowed to participate in exams and the number of students, who had 
only excellent marks. 
From Figure 5.2.3 it is obvious that the students in the ‘tuition fee’ system had a great 
percentage of fail marks. Conversely the students from the ‘no tuition fee’ system studied 
well. We can say that educational standards, entrance exams filter clever students from not so 
‘clever’ students but again this filtration for one time is not enough to conclude that chosen 
students will study very well. The total percentages of the failed students from the ‘no tuition 
fee’ and from the system ‘tuition fee’ are 13.20% and 28.24% accordingly. 
There is a dilemma if policy maker has chosen these students to finance their studying as 
prospective specialists why have they failed their exams? 
Figure 5.2.3 The percantage of the students who failed. 
The percentage of students who failed
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Note: The diagram was constructed based on the numbers of students who were allowed to participate in exams and the numbers of students, who failed their 
exam included the students number who have one failed, two failed and three failed exams. 
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 Figure 5.2.4 shows students mean scaled grades: Mean scaled grade = (Number of students 
got5*5+Number of students got 4*4 + Number of students got 3*3)/ total number of the 
students who took the exams. 
Figure 5.2.4 The students mean scaled grades without failed marks 
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  As for the study disciplines, from Table A2 and TableA3 it is seen that the number of 
students who were absent without any considerable reason was high for the students studying 
in the ‘tuition fee’ system, precisely it was 1 342 from 35 238 students or 3,8%. and only 1% 
for the students studying in a ‘no tuition fee’ system. From these figures it is hard to conclude 
whether the students from the ‘tuition fee’ system were not present because of low abilities to 
study or because of financial difficulties.  
 
To conclude, it is obvious that the students in ‘no tuition fee’ system studied better compared 
to the other system as they have higher mean scaled grades. 
 
So far we have discussed the data of two academic years that is 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 
separately. The table below is combing information about the students grades for two 
academic years with respect to ‘no tuition’ and ‘tuition fee’ systems. 
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Table 5.2.5 Summarized information given in percentages 
The percentage of the students with respect to their marks during 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 academic years. 
2005-2006 2006-2007  
‘n o ‘t ui
t
to
t
al
 
‘n o ‘t ui
t
to
t
al
 
The % of the students who passed their exams 78.4 64.7 69 84.9 67 72 
The % of the students studying with excellent  and      good marks 22.2 16.5 18.5 27 16 19 
The % of the students studying with only excellent marks 21.7 11.8 15.1 25   9.5 14 
The % of the students who have failed one exam 11.4 17.6 15.5   7.8 16 13.8 
The % of the students who have failed two exams   5.4   8.6 7.5   3.9   9 7.5 
The % of the students who have failed three exams   1.2   2.2 1.9   1.4   3.1 2.6 
Total number of the students allowed to take exams 17389 34709  14270 35238  
Note: The % of the students studying with excellent marks was calculated as the number of students with excellent grades in the ‘no tuition fee’ or tuition fee 
system divided by the total number of students studying in the ‘no tuition fee’ system or tuition fee system, who were allowed to take academic current exams, 
and then multiplied by 100. 
 
Judging from the figures of Table 5.2.5, the students in the ‘no tuition fee’ system were 
studying better in the 2006/2007 than in the academic year 2005/2006. Namely the percentage 
of the students with excellent marks was 21.7% in the year 2005/2006 and was 25 % in the 
year 2006/2007. The percentage of the students in the ‘no tuition fee’ system with the 
excellent and good marks was 4.08 % higher in the 2006/2007 year comparing with 
2005/2006. 
The percentage of students in the ‘no tuition fee’ system with only one failed exam is less in 
the year 2006/2007 year by 3.6% than in the year 2005/2006. Only the percentage of students 
with 3 failed exam slightly differs, more precisely 0,20 percentage is higher in the year 
2006/2007 than in the previous period. 
  
Thus, the results are compatible with the thought earlier made in this work, that new 
educational policy is more efficient, as it was seen that the percentage of students with 
excellent marks increased and the numbers of students with failed marks decreased. The new 
rules in the higher educational establishments induce students to study hard. 
Recalling the ‘Related literatures’ part of the work where the model suggested by Michael 
Rothschild’s & Lawrence J. White’s (1995) was discussed, as the good method to struggle 
against 3rd limitation14 in the point of view universities or policy maker is the supervision of 
the current grades of the students.  
                                                 
14 3) limitation of the model is: Although in the model it was assumed that universities were fully informed about 
students types and students were informed about universities types, in real life information asymmetries in the 
education field are faced 
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6. Conclusions 
To sum up it is efficient for policy maker and students to control education process in the 
higher education. The supervision allows policy makers to finance clever students, to create 
equal opportunities for students. Students in their turn compete with their peers try to be the 
best and get rid of tuition fees.          
The supervision is the most powerful tool against the adverse selection. It gives an additional 
opportunity to principal, or policy maker to reconsider and review the decision made earlier, 
that is if chosen students, who can not satisfy the appropriate academic standards during their 
academic years would be replaced by the new students who are more eligible for studying 
without tuition fee.                                                                                                                
In the framework of game theory again it is mutually profitable to study well. As for real life 
example, Armenian higher education reforms showed that it is really better strategy for 
university or supervision body to be consistent in investigating students’ studying process.                            
Comparing two periods it was seen that in new period that is 2006/2007 academic year, when 
policy maker is supervising the students’ grades, the students who were studying in ‘no 
tuition fee’ system tried to keep their places more consistently than in the previous period.                                                                                                             
As for failed exams again the result is improved, that is the students studying in the ‘no tuition 
fee’ in the period 2006/2007 with failed exams are less than in the previous academic period. 
Recalling the questions, discussed at the beginning of the work, which are  
1. How to find this balanced high educational system which is desirable almost for all 
members of society? 
 2. How to know if the Educational system is efficient for policy maker and student?  
It can be said that Third degree price discrimination is quite strong mean to reach to the 
desirable high educational system, considering of course that the educational standard are 
competitive with the modern educational standards. It is known that there is a sequential link 
between policy maker15-student- employer and than employer-employee-state , so as an 
answer for 1st question I would say that when there is an efficiently organized  education field 
other things equal, all members of society will get benefits from it.                                                                     
To answer second question I would use production scene: If policy maker is a company 
manager who wants to undertake efficient production process, he should have qualified 
                                                 
15 State 
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inputs. These qualified inputs in these particular case clever students will work with higher 
productivity because they are rewarded with extra money. Any economical strategy is 
justified for the rational economic agent when the costs do not exit the profit. The educational 
system is efficient for policy maker and student when policy maker and student get benefits 
from returns to schooling of the student.               
To sum up, although there are some shortcomings in Higher educational establishments, i. e.  
corruption, not sufficient funding of Universities, slow creation of new University-industry 
connection, low funding of research works, the country is trying to adjust the educational 
system to the New World economic conditions and allocate local resources effectively. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1Information about the students studying without tuition fee 
Data for 2005/2006  academic year --------2-nd----------------- exam session  
       /spring and winter / 
----------------------- ,  ------------------------------- ,  ----without tuition fee---------- ,  -----1-5/6/--------- 
                 /according to HES/  /without tuition fee/     /the year of studying/ 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
YSU 3277 13 3264 3257 95 70 2293 880 741 534 138 869 442 318 109 70.3%      
Ijevan YSU 416 6 410 410 0 0 274 110 77 65 22 136 79 32 25 66.8%      
SEUA 2138 17 2121 2117 1 0 1827 420 452 833 122 269 173 78 18 86.1%      
Gyumri SEUA 250 1 249 249 0 0 233 50 56 112 15 16 9 7 0 93.6%      
Vanadzor SEUA 224 0 224 224 0 0 195 34 62 92 7 29 13 16 0 87.1%      
Kapan SEUA 128 0 128 128 0 0 123 14 37 67 5 5 4 1 0 96.1%      
YSUArchitecture andCons. 739 2 737 737 0 0 577 104 89 251 133 160 90 59 11 78.3%      
AsU of Economics 1510 0 1510 1510 0 8 1272 446 362 379 85 230 136 94 0 84.2%      
Gyumri ASU of Economics. 92 0 92 92 5 6 72 19 15 17 21 9 9 0 0 78.3%      
AS Pedag. University 1605 0 1605 1568 37 49 1226 257 324 504 141 293 195 75 23 76.4%      
YSLinguisticUniversity 2265 6 2259 2154 148 66 1579 309 512 372 386 532 406 104 22 69.9%      
Gyumri State Pedag. Inst  826 0 826 826 95 0 671 102 147 282 140 60 46 12 2 81.2%      
Vanadzor State Pedag. Instit  621 0 621 620 5 49 485 102 106 195 82 82 68 14 0 78.1%      
(YSC)  412 3 409 408 3 24 380 196 143 35 6 1 1 0 0 92.9%      
Gyumri YSC. 22 0 22 22 0 0 22 4 5 2 11 0 0 0 0 100%      
YS Academy of Fine Arts* 243* 0 226 226 15 9 199 61 81 52 5 3 3 0 0 88.1%      
Gyumry YSA of Fine Arts 23 0 23 23 0 1 22 9 9 3 1 0 0 0 0 95.7%      
Dilijan YSA of Fine Arts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%      
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YSI of Theatre and Cinema 198 0 198 198 0 1 171 62 51 40 18 26 22 4 0 86.4%      
Gyumri YSI of theatre and C. 20 0 20 20 0 0 16 2 11 1 2 4 3 1 0 80.0%      
Vanadzor YSI of Theatre and 
C. 10 0 10 10 0 0 10 1 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 100% 
     
Goris  YSI of Theatre and C. 2 0 2 2 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 100%      
YS Medical * 1075** 6 1035 1035 102 46 786 304 251 101 130 101 61 40 0 75.9%      
ASI of Physical Culture  570 1 569 568 0 0 478 119 149 192 18 90 68 20 2 84.0%      
 (ASAU) 996 9 987 985 18 40 715 169 183 247 116 212 151 59 2 72.4%      
Gavar SU  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0%      
Total 17662 64 17547 17389 524 369 13628 3774 3869 4380 1605 3127 1979 934 214 77.7%      
 
* - notations with this sign  include the number of  students writing master thesis in their 6th year  
 
 
 
 
Table A.2Information about the students studying with tuition fee 
Data for 2005/2006  academic year --------2-nd----------------- exam session  
       /spring and winter / 
----------------------- ,  ------------------------------- ,  ----with tuition fee---------- ,  -----1-5/6/--------- 
                 /according to HES/      /with tuition fee/ /the year of studying 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
YSU 6930 11 6919 6871 425 260 3876 866 1375 1273 362 2570 1504 821 245 56.0%      
 Ijevan YSU 788 26 762 762 0 0 252 49 66 85 52 510 162 119 229 33.1%      
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SEUA 4393 480 3913 3900 11 0 2828 410 536 1405 477 1081 646 330 105 72.3%      
Gyumri SEUA 515 23 492 492 5 0 351 32 62 187 70 136 69 62 5 71.3%      
Vanadzor SEUA 361 20 341 341 1 0 223 23 38 132 30 117 41 72 4 65.4%      
Kapan SEUA 265 21 244 244 1 0 217 13 42 139 23 26 22 2 2 88.9%      
YSUArchitecture and Cons. 1158 1 1157 1157 0 0 698 54 67 339 238 449 252 165 32 60.3%      
Armenian State University of 
Economics 3325 0 3325 3325 0 78 2352 372 568 1027 385 895 450 433 12 70.7% 
     
Gyumri ASU of Economics. 263 0 263 259 8 16 196 22 38 59 77 39 35 4 0 74.5%      
AS Pedagogical University 4845 0 4845 4511 334 382 2990 461 807 1280 442 1139 779 275 85 61.7%      
YS LinguisticUniversity 905 5 900 898 46 17 739 272 238 157 72 115 83 25 7 82.1%      
Gyumri State Pedag. Inst 1891 4 1887 1887 377 0 1036 105 183 424 324 475 383 86 6 54.9%      
Vanadzor State Pedagog. Inst 1714 0 1714 1696 21 177 899 126 177 387 209 617 464 142 11 52.5%      
 (YSC) 712 1 711 710 6 114 589 250 216 81 42 2 2 0 0 82.8%      
Gyumri YSC. 87 0 87 84 0 0 74 14 20 19 21 3 3 0 0 85.1%      
YS Academy of Fine Arts* 407* 0 392 392 65 49 259 31 87 126 15 19 12 7 0 66.1%      
Gyumry YSA of Fine Arts 126 0 126 125 0 6 112 25 33 45 9 8 5 2 1 88.9%      
Dilijan YSA of Fine Arts 29 0 29 29 0 0 29 1 8 19 1 0 0 0 0 100%      
YSI of Theatre and Cinema 323 0 323 323 1 13 257 65 94 77 21 52 48 4 0 79.6%      
Gyumri YSI Theat.and C.. 52 0 52 52 0 0 43 5 11 9 18 9 5 4 0 82.7%      
Vanadzor YSI Theat. And C. 30 0 30 30 0 2 28 7 7 12 2 0 0 0 0 93.3%      
Goris YSI of Theat. And C. 14 0 14 14 0 0 14 5 3 2 4 0 0 0 0 100%      
YS Medical University * 1602 24 1578 1578 121 161 982 186 339 171 286 314 234 80 0 62.2%      
ASI of Physical Culture  963 5 958 957 0 0 700 171 115 277 137 257 189 58 10 73.1%      
AS Agrarian University 
(ASAU) 2891 256 2635 2616 41 180 1496 188 270 584 454 899 625 259 15 56.8% 
     
Gavar SU   1548 0 1548 1456 20 90 1218 347 349 340 182 128 87 41 0 78.7%      
Total 36137 877 35245 34709 1483 1545 22458 4100 5749 8656 3953 9860 6100 2991 769 63.7%      
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Table A.3Information about the students studying without tuition fee 
Data for 2006/2007  academic year --------2-nd----------------- exam session  
       /spring and winter / 
----------------------- ,  ------------------------------- ,  ----without tuition fee---------- ,  -----1-5/6/--------- 
                 /according to HES/  /without tuition fee/     /the year of studying/ 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
YSU 2322 1 2321 2319 20 34 1824 679 664 419 62 475 228 163 84 78.6      
Ijevan YSU 327 0 327 327 0 0 232 82 112 37 1 95 45 20 30 70.9      
SEUA 2026 14 2012 2012 1 0 1833 514 415 834 70 178 121 40 17 91.1      
Gyumri  SEUA 246 3 243 243 0 0 225 54 91 73 7 18 12 6 0 92.6      
Vanadzor SEUA 204 0 204 204 0 0 184 29 98 47 10 20 8 9 3 90.2      
Kapan SEUA 126 1 125 125 0 0 121 17 52 44 8 4 3 1 0 96.8      
YSU of Architecture and Cons 620 0 620 620 0 0 514 141 129 143 101 106 61 31 14 82.9      
ASU of Economics 1211 1 1210 1210 0 4 1094 364 310 327 93 112 70 39 3 90.4      
Gyumri ASU of Economics. 68 0 68 68 4 2 52 11 2 18 21 9 5 4 0 76.5      
AS Pedagogical University 1585 0 1585 1585 13 27 1300 340 341 553 66 245 139 74 32 82.0      
YS LinguisticUniversity 905 2 903 903 25 2 802 243 177 363 19 76 45 23 8 88.8      
Gyumri State Pedag.  826 0 826 826 65 0 732 138 226 273 95 29 26 3 0 88.6      
Vanadzor State Pedag.  446 0 446 446 0 10 377 89 101 149 38 59 42 16 1 84.5      
Yerevan Komitas State 344 2 342 342 5 25 309 156 126 24 3 3 2 1 0 90.4      
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Conservatory (YSC) 
Gyumri YSC. 23 0 23 23 0 0 23 8 14 0 1 0 0 0 0 100      
YS Academy of Fine Arts* 240 0 194 194 13 9 166 62 58 46 0 6 3 3 0 85.6      
Gyumry YSAof Fine Arts 22 0 22 22 0 0 19 11 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 86.4      
Dilijan YSA of Fine Arts 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0      
YSIof Theatre and Cinema 168 0 168 168 0 1 157 50 60 41 6 10 10 0 0 93.4      
Gyumri YSI of theatre and C. 16 0 16 16 0 0 14 0 11 3 0 2 1 1 0 87.5      
Vanadzor YSI of Theatre and C 11 0 11 11 0 1 10 3 6 1 0 0 0 0 0 90.9      
Goris YSI of Theatre and C 3 0 3 3 0 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 66.7      
YSMedical University * 1031 0 856 856 13 0 647 164 292 178 13 196 116 71 9 75.6      
ASI of Physical Culture  583 0 583 583 1 0 535 149 236 121 29 47 40 5 2 91.8      
ASAgrarian University (ASAU) 987 15 972 978 3 24 760 207 229 198 126 191 141 49 1 78.2      
Gavar SU  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0      
Goris SU  187 1 186 186 0 4 178 70 58 40 10 4 3 0 1 95.7      
Total 14527 40 14266 14270 163 144 12110 3581 3812 3938 779 1885 1121 559 205 84.9      
 
* - notations with this sign  include the number of  students writing master thesis in their 6th year  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46 
 
 
 
 
Table A.4Information about the students studying with tuition fee 
 
 
Data for 2006/2007  academic year --------2-nd----------------- exam session  
       /spring and winter / 
----------------------- ,  ------------------------------- ,  ----with tuition fee---------- ,  -----1-5/6/--------- 
                 /according to HES/      /with tuition fee/ /the year of studying 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
YSU 5501 4 5497 5476 110 256 3480 637 1226 1368 249 1886 1030 642 214 63.3      
 Ijevan YSU 693 14 679 679 17 0 176 34 64 71 7 503 104 90 309 25.9      
SEUA 4105 302 3803 3788 17 0 2853 396 497 1653 307 928 552 241 135 75.0      
Gyumri SEUA 514 27 487 487 0 0 374 47 62 174 91 113 60 51 2 76.8      
Vanadzor SEUA 340 21 319 319 0 0 215 22 49 108 36 104 46 55 3 67.4      
Kapan SEUA 287 26 261 260 0 0 239 18 45 146 30 21 14 7 0 91.6      
YSUArchitecture and Cons. 1044 7 1037 1028 2 7 631 76 122 279 154 397 211 127 59 60.8      
ASU of Economics 2918 5 2913 2913 0 43 2281 226 463 1090 502 589 326 252 11 78.3      
 47 
Gyumri ASU of Economics. 239 0 239 229 7 13 171 22 22 57 70 38 29 7 2 71.5      
AS Pedagogical University 5618 0 5618 5359 259 430 3434 546 763 1765 360 1495 856 439 200 61.1      
YS LinguisticUniversity 2748 13 2735 2711 85 32 1987 197 355 1374 61 663 367 253 43 72.7      
Gyumri State Pedag. Inst 2125 0 2125 2125 420 0 1340 164 217 533 426 365 308 53 4 63.1      
Vanadzor State Pedag. Inst 1525 0 1525 1525 1 79 969 81 197 482 209 476 327 143 6 63.5      
Yerevan Komitas State 
Conservatory (YSC) 
554 6 548 531 3 181 330 76 159 95 0 17 16 1 0 60.2      
Gyumri YSC. 75 2 73 73 1 0 60 11 18 17 14 12 10 2 0 82.2      
YS Academy of Fine Arts* 430 0 369 369 60 34 260 31 84 141 4 15 12 3 0 70.5      
Gyumry YSA of Fine Arts 152 0 152 150 0 2 115 10 42 41 22 17 16 1 0 75.7      
Dilijan YSA of Fine Arts 34 0 28 28 0 0 28 4 6 18 0 0 0 0 0 100      
YSI of Theatre and Cinema 296 0 296 296 0 6 252 61 55 123 13 38 32 3 3 85.1      
Gyumri YSI Theat.and C.. 52 0 52 52 0 0 34 2 9 17 6 18 15 2 1 65.4      
Vanadzor YSI Theat. And C. 31 0 31 31 0 0 31 4 6 16 5 0 0 0 0 100      
Goris YSI of Theat. And C. 16 0 16 16 0 0 16 2 3 6 5 0 0 0 0 100      
YS Medical University  1721 7 1491 1491 18 0 789 74 287 384 44 684 358 269 57 52.9      
ASI of Physical Culture  1021 0 1021 1021 1 0 759 142 151 344 122 261 167 71 23 74.3      
AS Agrarian University (ASAU) 3002 341 2661 2667 10 127 1513 242 352 434 485 1017 629 387 1 56.9      
Gavar SU   1173 0 1173 1150 33 85 796 183 235 287 91 236 163 56 17 67.9      
Goris SU  497 33 464 464 0 47 357 47 98 139 73 60 35 20 5 76.9      
Total 36711 808 35613 35238 1044 1342 23490 3355 5587 11162 3386 9953 5683 3175 1095 67.0      
 
